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Abstract 
Although security questions are still widely adopted, 
they still have several limitations. Previous research 
found that using system-generated information to 
answer security questions could be more secure than 
users’ own answers. However, using system-generated 
information has usability limitations. To improve 
usability, previous research proposed the design of 
system-generated fictitious profiles. The information 
from these profiles would be used to answer security 
questions. However, no research has studied the 
elements that could influence the design of fictitious 
profiles or systems that use them to answer security 
questions. To address this research gap, we conducted 
an empirical investigation through 20 structured 
interviews. Our main findings revealed that to improve 
the design of fictitious profiles, users should be given 
the option to configure the profiles to make them 
relatable, interesting and memorable. We also found 
that the security questions currently provided by 
websites would need to be enhanced to cater for 
fictitious profiles. 
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Figure 1: Fictitious profile (Female) 
Introduction 
Due to various limitations [4], some online services 
(e.g. Facebook and Google) started moving away from 
using security questions and started using text-based 
and email-based mechanisms to recover forgotten 
passwords [4]. However, security questions are still 
widely adopted [2], and research is still being 
conducted to mitigate their limitations [15]. 
The main limitations of security questions are that they 
are vulnerable to: (1) social engineering attacks [5,17] 
(e.g. through social networks [12]); (2) dictionary/ 
guessing attacks when answers have a limited answers 
space [5]; and (3) insider attacks [13], since partners 
could guess 20% of answers [13]. These limitations 
could be mitigated by using system-generated 
information to answer security questions, because they 
were found to be more secure than users’ own answers 
[1,14]. However, using system-generated information 
has usability limitations (mainly memorability) [1,14]. 
To improve the usability of system-generated 
information, Micallef and Just [9] proposed the design 
of system-generated information in the form of 
fictitious profiles. However, no research has 
investigated the elements that could influence the 
design of fictitious profiles or systems that use them to 
answer security questions, with the purpose of 
improving their usability. Hence, to address this 
research gap, we conducted 20 structured interviews. 
We provided participants with 2 fictitious profiles (see 
Figure 1 shown female profile) and explained how 
these profiles would be used to answer security 
questions. In these interviews we asked participants 
about: (1) the elements that would affect the selection 
of a fictitious profile; (2) the attributes that they would 
prefer a fictitious profile to have (or not have); (3) the 
required level of configurability and availability of the 
fictitious profiles; and (4) whether they would consider 
using fictitious profiles to answer security questions. 
The main contribution of this work to the usable security 
field is a set of recommendations that would improve the 
design of systems that would generate fictitious profiles 
for answering security questions and systems that use 
security questions to recover passwords. 
 
Methodology 
We conducted structured interviews with 20 participants, 
to investigate the elements that could influence the design 
of fictitious profiles and systems that would use them to 
answer security questions [18]. University’s ethic approval 
was obtained before starting the interviews. 
We recruited participants through word of mouth and 
social connections. The 20 participants were 5 females and 
15 males (mean age=30, (22-45) and med=28). Most 
participants (15) were post-grads and the rest (5) were 
employed full-time. Everyone was experienced and 
confident with using security questions. 
Interviews were conducted by one researcher in different 
places to satisfy the individual needs of the participants 
(e.g. in the meeting room next to the participant’s office). 
All interviews were conducted in-person. We used a 
structured interview protocol to understand how users’ 
feedback would affect the design of systems that generate 
fictitious profiles for security questions and security 
questions mechanisms that would provide questions based 
on these profiles. 
In the beginning, participants were briefed about the 
study, were asked to read an information sheet and sign a 
consent form. Participants also completed a pre-study 
questionnaire to collect demographic information together 
with details about their experience with using security 
questions. Afterwards, we showed participants 2 fictitious 
profiles – both male and female (see Figure 1 shown 
Female) and explained that the details of these profiles 
would be used to answer security questions. Then, we 
asked questions to understand the elements that would 
affect the selection of a fictitious profile, the attributes 
that participants would prefer, the level of configurability 
and availability that a fictitious profile should have. Finally, 
we asked participants whether they would consider using 
fictitious profiles to answer security questions (see box on 
the left for the exact questions). 
 
 
 
1 http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/password-entropy 
2 http://www.fakenamegenerator.com 
 Constant Comparative Method (CCM) 
To identify themes from the collected qualitative 
information we used an adapted version [3] of the 
constant comparative method (CCM) approach [6], 
which has been used in HCI research to analyse 
qualitative feedback [8]. The interviewer recorded 
the participants’ responses to the interview questions 
in the form of detailed notes. These notes were later 
coded by two researchers independently. Both 
researchers used the created codes to identify 
common themes from the collected feedback. In 
most instances, the themes identified/extracted by 
the two researchers were similar. In the few 
instances in which there was a disagreement, a third 
researcher was asked to break the tie. The next 
section outlines the main themes extracted from 
these interviews. 
 
Results 
What elements affect the selection of fictitious 
profiles? 
To understand the elements that affect the selection 
of fictitious profiles we asked participants to select 
one of the provided profiles (male or female - Figure 
1: Fictitious profile) and to motivate their choice. The 
themes extracted from the provided feedback are 
that the elements that affected the selection of 
fictitious profile were: (1) relatability/connectedness 
(e.g. P10 said “I selected the profile because he is 
male. It is easier for me to associate myself to a 
male character. Because then I can just compare it 
to myself.”); (2) memorability (e.g. P1 said “Male 
because there are some things which are 
memorable”); (3) interesting attributes (e.g. P16 
said: “the female one. She seems more interesting. 
We have a lot of things in common.”). 
 
Are there any preferred attribute categories? 
We asked participants to mark on the provided 
fictitious profiles the attributes that they would keep, 
remove and add to the profile (see Figure 2). The 
main finding from Table 1 is that participants prefer 
attributes related to basic info (text), characteristics 
and favourites and would remove numeric attributes 
(finance). Our results seem to be inconclusive on whether 
fictitious profiles for security questions attributes should have 
related to basic info (numbers), places and physical 
characteristics. Also, our findings reveal that most of our 
participants would like to add attributes in the favourites and 
characteristics categories. 
 
What level of configurability should these profiles have? 
We asked participants about their desired level of 
configurability in a fictitious profile that would be used to 
answer security questions. Most participants (14/20) reported 
that these fictitious profiles should be configurable. However, 
the qualitative feedback reveals that participants were divided 
in terms of the desired level of configurability of these profiles. 
Almost half the participants (11/20) reported that the profile 
should be highly configurable, meaning that the users should 
be able to modify specific values (e.g. P15 said “a detailed one 
because it would be easily memorised”). On the other hand, 
9/20 participants reported that the level of configurability 
should be low, meaning that users should only be able to 
modify basic attributes, such as age, gender and country (e.g. 
P6 said “basic stuff, use age range and then generate profile 
based on that”). 
 
What level of availability should these profiles have? 
Participants were also asked about the level of availability that 
a fictitious profile should have. Availability is important because 
it helps understand the security measures that should be used 
to protect these fictitious profiles. Almost all participants 
(16/20) reported that they would prefer the fictitious profile to 
be available all the time, while only 4/20 reported that the 
profile should have a limited availability. The qualitative 
analysis of the provided feedback did not reveal any common 
themes to explain why participants would prefer to access the 
profile all the time. 
 
Would users use fictitious profiles and why? 
Finally, we wanted to understand whether participants would 
consider using fictitious profiles to answer security questions. 
Almost half the participants (11/20) reported that they would 
consider using a fictitious profile, while 8/20 reported that they 
Questions asked in 
structured interviews 
 
Elements affecting profile 
selection: 
Which profile would you use? 
and Why? 
 
Attributes selection: 
On the provided sheet mark 
the attributes that: 
• the profile should have. 
• the profile should not 
have. 
• you would add. 
 
Configurability: 
Would you like to be able to 
configure the profile? 
What level of configurability 
should the profile have? 
 
Availability: 
Would you like the profile to be 
available to you anytime? or do 
you want to see it just once? 
 
Potential use: 
Would you consider using a 
fictitious profile to answer 
security questions? 
Explain Why? 
would prefer to use their own answers. Only 1 
participant could not makeup his/her mind. The main 
theme extracted from those participants that 
reported that they would consider using 
a fictitious profile is that it would help them improve 
the security of their online accounts (e.g. P4 said: “it 
would be good because no-one would know the 
answer. That would be more secure than using real 
answers”). Alternatively, the main theme extracted 
from those participants that would prefer to use their 
own answers are that they are not ready to trade-off 
memorability for an improved security [10] (e.g. P11 
said: “because I prefer to answer questions and 
answers that I'm pretty sure that I can remember”). 
 
Discussion and Recommendations 
Improving the design of fictitious profiles 
Our main findings reveal that our participants prefer 
fictitious profiles that are highly configurable, to make 
them relatable, interesting and memorable. Hence, 
we recommend that designers of systems that would 
generate fictitious profiles for security questions 
should implement techniques that prevent users from 
configuring the fictitious profiles to match their own 
attributes or to define attributes with a limited answer 
space, as this would defeat the purpose of having 
system-generated profiles. This could be achieved by 
checking that the attributes do not match the users’ 
social networking accounts. 
 
Compatibility with current security questions 
Our participants seemed to prefer security questions 
related to characteristics and favourites. Currently, 
most security questions are about names, places and 
favourites [5,12]. Hence, if fictitious profiles had to be 
widely adopted, we recommend that designers of 
systems that provide security questions as a 
mechanism to recover forgotten passwords should 
enhance the security questions that they provide. 
Otherwise their systems would not cater for those 
users that would want to use fictitious profiles. 
Availability vs security 
Our findings also reveal that users would prefer fictitious profiles 
to be available all the time. Thus, more availability of these 
profiles would increase the possibility that these fictitious 
profiles could be compromised. Hence, we recommend that 
system designers should invest a considerable amount of time 
and effort to implement stronger security measures (e.g. 
encryption and anonymization techniques) to protect these 
profiles. 
 
Improving potential adoption of fictitious profiles 
More than half of our participant would consider using 
fictitious profiles to answer security questions. 
However, the rest of our participants reported that they would 
prefer to use their own answers due to memorability concerns. 
This finding seems to indicate that memorability could limit the 
usability of system-generated information [1,14] even when 
designed as a fictitious profile. Hence, we recommend that to 
improve the potential adoption of fictitious profiles when 
answering security questions, further research needs to 
investigate techniques that could improve the memorability of 
these profiles. Very recently [7,16] proposed the use of a 
serious games to improve the memorability of stronger answers 
to security questions. However, there is no empirical evidence 
that validates the effectiveness of these techniques on the 
long-term. 
 
Further Research 
In our next studies, we will empirically evaluate whether the 
fictitious profiles designed in this research do actually improve 
the usability (mainly memorability) of system-generated 
information when answering security questions. Moreover, 
since our findings indicate that fictitious profiles seem to have 
been well received by our participants, we also suggest that 
further research should be conducted to investigate the design 
of fictitious profiles for other application areas. For example, to 
understand how users would design fictitious profiles to 
anonymise and protect their privacy when registering to online 
accounts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of attributes 
marked by participants 
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